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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATiiON C!O·MP ANY, 
Plaintiff omd A 'J!(JJellxunt, 
vs. 
CLARENCE T. J·ONES and ED 
H. W .&TSON, State Engineer of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants wnd Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7189 
We do not disagree with the brief opening statement 
of Appellant, as far as it goes. While te-chnically, the 
appeal is from the District Court, the action of the State 
Engineer in granting the applications and permitting us 
to try to acquire water rights, presents the controlling 
question here. His findings, which are not modified or 
changed by the ·Court 'below, wi1l be used as th·e basis for 
our brief. 
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Appellant has the burden of establishing error in 
his conclusions. We will cite the record in case 14645, 
as it appears to be c.omplete. It also contains some 
docum·ents belonging to the files in cases 14646 and 14647. 
We will c.ite pages from this record with the letter "R," 
and pages of the transcript of evidence with the letter 
"T." 
THE ISSUES 
The only point briefed and relief upon is that the 
original sour0e of the waters involved was Weber River, 
and that the waters are covered by ffiings made by the 
United States, through the Bureau of Reclamation, or 
assigned to it. That under these, the department has the 
right to, and may claim reposs·ession of the waters in-, 
volved. 
These filings were not admitted in evidence. And no 
point of error is argued on the r-\;Iling excluding them. 
Appellant makes, and appears to rely entirely upon, the 
statement (P. 5), that: "The project known as the Deer 
Creek Reservoir and the Weber River Irrigation System 
is so well known that we think the Court will judicially 
notice the same and the details with resp~ect thereto.'' 
We do not know as to this, or as to how far it may 
go. However, it seems unnecessary to contest it at any 
length. 
It is true, that there is ·evidence, and a finding as to 
each spring, hy the State Engineer (R. 14) that: "How-
ever, 'vith the increased application of irrigation waters 
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on the higher lands and, in particular, the use of Deer 
Creek waters thereon, the flow from the sp-ring has in 
the past few years, materially increased so that it now 
yields more "Tater than would have been availa'ble to the 
protestant 'Yere it not for the increased irrigation of 
upper lands. 
The trial ·Court~s finding supports this (R. 26). The 
Appellant claims only a diligence right to the water of 
Dry ·Creek available to it prior to 1903, since which time 
statutes have required that applications be made hy filing 
with the State Engineer. The finding ;(R. 25) that they 
have only this right and that they ''make no claim of, or 
any claim under any filing since 1903, '' ie not challenged. 
Thus, and by reason, of the abandonment in the Brief 
of any contention that their right will be interfered with 
by the g-ranting of this application, or even the perfec-
tion of a water right thereunder, they have eliminated 
any such issue from the case. 'The claim here is merely 
that some one foreign to the case, might hav.e objected, 
or could object, to our use of the water attempted to be 
filed on. 
We come, therefore, to the consideration of the 
single point briefed and to the question as to whether 
(1) that point can be now raised here, for the first time, 
or (2) raised by this Appellant at all and, if so, (3) 
whether it has merit. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMEN'T 
General Rules Applicable: 
The State Engineer's decision (R. 15) was: "Fol-
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4 
lowing the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in cases 
like Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Kimball, it 
would appear that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the applicant can perfect this application. The applica-
tion is therefore granted, subject to prior rights.'' 
· This is in harmony with the decisions of this Court 
establishing the policy of promoting the greatest possible 
use of water. Also with the decisions that the granting 
of the application does not effect an ap,propriation. It 
merely affords an opportunity for the Engineer to see if 
proper appropriation by the applicant to a beneficial use 
can he effected, without interference with objector's 
rights, or subject thereto. He is charged with the duty 
of general administration, the duty to bring about the 
largest us·e possible, and the duty to prevent waste. 
(100-2-1) 
Little Cottonwood v. Kimball, 76 U 243, 289 P. 116. 
Eardley v. Terry, 94 U 367, 77 P. (2) 362. 
In the former case it was said that it is the duty of 
the Engineer to grant the application if there ''is or 
may 'be'' water available for ap,propriation. 
And, in the latter case ''if there is probable cause 
to believe that there is unap·propriated waters available 
or waters which c:an be made av,ailable for use." 
The Courj:s below and here can only determine 
whether the ·sta.te Engineer rightly ap-proved the appli-
cation, as against the protest of an App~ellant. And will 
sustain him where he does not act ''arbitrarily or capri-
ciously.'' 
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Eardley Y. Terry~ Supra. 
TannerY. Bacon, 103 U. at 506, 136 P. (2) at 962. 
Spring Waters- Percolating: 
,, ... e briefly point out the reasons for these applica-
tions covering ""'"aters arising in springs on our own land. 
,, .... e are a\vare, that under the decisions of this ·Court, 
reviewed in Stookey v. Green, 178 P. 586, it has been 
held: ~·If it is private land and the water is percolating, 
as known and understood at common law, then it is 
nDt the subject of appropriation as against the owner 
of the land.'' The point is now before this Court, how-
ever, in Riordan v. Westwood. 
Some contention was made in the Court below, that 
since \Ye apparently already had the water, we couldn't 
appl~v to apropriate any part of it. The Court in effect 
held that this was no concern of the Appellant. That 
they would not be affected either way. This is not raised 
here. 
And, we are also aware, that such waters when 
allowed to escape, without indication of p!resent inten-
tion of the prior irrigator to reclaim and use them, may 
become subject to down stream or lower appropriations, 
and to successive approp-riations. The policy is to keep 
waters working. 
Clark v. Nor. Cottonwood Irr. Co., 79 U 425, 11 
P. (2) 300. 
Smithfield W·est Bench v. Union Life, 142 P. (2) 
866. 
So, by placing these applications we may be a!ble to 
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hold a priority on escaping waters up to the amounts 
applied for, pending the completion of the expenditures 
and improvements to enable us to put the same to use. 
This must all be done before we can make proof for, or 
complete an appropriation, or receive a certificate. 
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kent Lakes Res. Co., 140 
P. (2) 6·38 at 640. 
Points Argued : 
I. 
The point now plliesent~ed is that Appellant cannot here 
for the first tim~e mise tbe claim briefed. 
This Court on appeal is restricted to questions, 
Issues and theories p:resented in the Court below. 
U. S. Bldg. & Loan Ass 'n v. Midvale Home Fin. 
Corp., 86 U 522, 46 P. (2) 672. 
Huber v. Newman, 145 P. (2) 780,782. 
Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239, 1~58 P. 788. 
And, see additional cases cited in Volume 6, 406, 
UCA 1943. 
Appellant's protests to the State Engineer are not 
in evidence. The issue presented there is, however, re-
cited by the State Engineer (R. 14): 
'' ~l_1he protest is based primarily upon the conten-
tion that all of the water from the springs in question 
has been appropriated by the protestant and that there 
is no unappropriated water * * *. 
"But, as ·agaJinst that C~o~pany, (Appellant) it does 
appear that this increased flow of the spring caused from 
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'Yaters * * • . 
··Under the case of Little Cottonwood Water Com-
pany Y. Kimball, ·76 U. 243, and other similar cases, the 
State Engineer should approve an application, if there 
is reasonable ground for 'be1ieving that the applicant 
might he able to perfect a right.'' 
It "i.ll be noticed that the State Engineer determined 
the matter d as against" Appellant and as between the 
parties to the then claimed conflict. 
_A._ppellant's complaint (R. 1) alleges its ownership 
of all 'Yater of Dry Creek and all its springs and sources 
of supply. It then pleads that there is no unappropri-
ated waters in any contributory springs or within th·e 
area of the application, because it a11 belongs to it, be-
cause such ''have been, and now are put to a beneficial 
use by Appellant herein." They pray ('R. 3) that their 
said rights be decreed to be "prior and superior to any 
claims and demands of the Defendant.'' ''Pleadings, 
practice and procedure'' in this case are the same as in 
equity cases generally. (100-3-15). Thus any claim, as 
to unappropriated waters, was based upon the claim, 
that there are none such because the waters involved 
belong to Appellant. 
We offered some evidence to show additional irriga-
tion on the bench land above by respondent and others 
through the Provo Res. Canal System, com1nencing- when 
that canal was build in 1913. (T. 27.) There "\Vas some 
testilnony that prior to and during and since 1944 there 
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8 
had been increased irrigation up there, main1y by the 
use of water from Weber River, and an additional in-
crease in the springs. (T. 68-72.) 
~rhere is no allegation as to any right of the Vnited 
States Reclamation Department to this water, or any 
claim that it isn't subject to our filing, by reason of the 
fact that that Department might have the intention of 
some time recovering it. And nothing as to Respond-
ent's reliance thereon. 
The State Engineer found: ''These waters have 
escaped the original appropriators and have returned to 
a natural water channel and issue in the form of 
springs.'' ·There is no claim that their re-use by the De-
partment would add to Appellant's water supply. 
II. 
Thl's point is that Appellant cannot be heard here at 
all on ·the .claim briefed, that the Reclamation Department 
might reclaim and re-use the water involved. 
It would se~to be elementary that one water user 
It 
cannot be heard to object because somebody is using or 
is attempting to appropriate for us·e water which may 
be claimed by a third party. We wil'l show that even 
an owner of right to water cannot object to its use by 
ap.other unless he is ready and able to put it to a bene-
ficial uge himself. 
Appellant's point is that prior filings by, and the 
right or the possibility of the Department repossessing 
these waters for re-us·e make them unappropriated 
waters, as to its claim. ·''A pprop·ria tion'' and ' 'una p-
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propriated'' are ter1ns of very uncertain m·eaning and 
application. 
\Y" eil v\T ater Rights, page 304. 
\\~rathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 40 P. (2) 755, held that 
in addition to the application for use and intent, appro-
priation requires the actual diversion and the a pplica.tion 
to a useful and beneficial purpose. 
It is certain that the filing of an application and its 
approval is not an appropriation, whether this is accom-
plished 'by the Reclamation Department, or 'by the re-
spondent. 
Duchesne Co. v. Humphreys, 106 U 382, 148 P. (2) 
338, 339. 
Des. Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 U. 25, 23'9 P. 
479, and the cases cited above. 
In any event the actual or anticipated claims of 
strangers cannot affect the result here. 
Weil Water Right, 3d. ed., Page 682. 
"627: Nor COIYIJ Rights of St11arng0rs Affect theRe-
sult Between the Parties Litigant.-N ot being hound nor 
before the court at all, the rights of strangers corre-
spondingly cannot affect the suit; it must be determined 
upon the relative rights alone of those before the court. 
It cannot avail one party to say that some stranger to 
the suit has a better right than his op·ponent. !The su-
preine court of the United States has said: 'Neither do 
we think that the trial court was called upon, at the 
instance of the defendants, entire strangers in every 
aspect to other appropriators, to inquire into and pass 
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upon the question whether appropriators of water below 
the mouth of the proposed canal would be injured by the 
construction of the canal. 'The rights of such persons 
will not, of course, he injuriously affected by the de-
cree in this caus-e, and non oonst~at but that they may 
yet intervene for their own protection, if they deem that 
the construction of the canal will be an invasion of their 
rights, or that they may be willing to forego objection 
to the construction of the canal.' '' 
'The eases cited indicate that this rule applies here 
and in any similar situation. It would seem to apply 
with greater reason, wher·e only the initiation of a right 
is involved, and where the Departm·ent may make its own 
objection, if it has one. This use may be favored by it. 
See also St. George & Washington Canal v. 
Hurricane Co., 93 U. 262, 72 P. (2) 642, at 647, 
par. 7. 
Page 679 (3d ed.) same author. 
''6'25: Castes Are Gove.rned by the Relative Rights 
of the P,arties Before the Cou.rt.-It is a general princi-
ple of law that the court can determine the rights only 
of the parties to the suit, and only as between themselves. 
They may both he wrongdoers as against a third person, 
yet that third person may never set up his right against 
either of them. It is the office of the court to adjudge 
only the relative right! in actual controversy of th~e 
plaintiffs against the defendants and vice versa. * * • 
It is too o'bvious to require elaboration that the parties 
to a lawsuit must fight it out between themselves, and 
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at the ~nine tiine its re~nlt~ affect them alone.'' 
A party, \Yho i~ ~eeking to appropriate water, may 
do so as against a third party's objection to the appro-
priation, eYen though he is a tte1npting to do it by the 
nse of the ditches and over the lands of a third party 
\Yi thou.f the party · s consent. 
\Veil \\' ater Rights, 3rd ed., Page 421. 
The san1e author at pag·e 504 says: 
d '\Vhen the appropriator is no longer using the 
\Yater either for the season or any specific time, his right 
to cut off or interfere with the flow of the stream for the 
time being lapse1.' * * * 
'' 'And the owner not requiring its use should not 
be permitted to complain of its application to a beneficial 
use by others interested. In other words. at all times 
that the water is not required by one or more, it must 
be at the disposal of others in the order of their relative 
rights thereto.' In an oft-cited opinion by Judge Haw-
ley it is said: 'In the appropriation of water, there can-
not he any ''dog in the manger'' business by either 
party, to interfere with the rights of others, when no 
beneficial use of the water is or can be made by the party 
causing such interference.' The same case holds that 
waste in the use of water is not permissible. * * * 
''Water codes usually contain the provision ''bene-
ficial use ~hall be the basis, the measure and the limit of 
the right.' And statutes generally enact the same rule 
in other forms.'' 
It would seem too absurd to ask this Court on this 
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record to determine this appeal on anything with refer-
ence to any claim on any filing relating to Deer Creek. 
It is clear that A·ppellant has not the slightest possible 
interest in whether this respondent may complete an 
appropriation on the water covered by the applications, 
or on any part of it. '1' 
The following Utah Water Cases bear on this point: 
Mt. Olivet ·Cemetery v. S. L. City, 65 U. 1'93, 235 
P. 876, 879. 
Sigurd City v. State, 105 U. 278, 142 P. (2) 154, 
157, Par. 1. 
If appellant now desires to proceed, as he does, en-
tirely on the ground that some third party owns this 
water, then appellant has no right to have the courts 
review the action of the State Engineer. 
Section 100-3-14 provides for a review of the 
State Engineer's decision. This section gives a 
right of r·eview in the courts to "any person ag-
grieved by such decision.'' On the only theory of 
the appellant, appel'lant has not been aggrieved. 
III. 
This point is that the authority cit·ed does not apply 
here, and does not sustain Ap,ellant's contention. 
In connection with the previous point, it will be 
noted that in the case cited by Appellant, and in those 
cited therein, the party seeking to repossess the waters 
is the immediate owner of the right involved and assert-
ed. 
Also, that there, the proceedings were not on the 
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mere Inatter of approval of an application to appropri-
ate waters, but on established rights of plaintiffs which 
embraced the right purpose and intent to re-capture and 
use the \Yaters involved. The filings on the W eher River 
by the Department for storage at Deer ·Creek have no 
inti1na~ion of purpose to re-capture, and there is before 
the Court no intimation of this, or of any, conflict be-
t,veen it and the respondent . 
.. 
The State Engineer's order approved respondent's 
applications "subject to prior rights". fl,e suggests no 
conflict between the Department and the applicant. As 
stated above, there was no issue on this. He does sug-
gest a possible claim by Utah Lake appropriators, as 
being a • 'more serious question'' ( R. 1,5), which, he says, 
if presented, he would be called upon to answer. He 
refers to the ".,.aters here involved as waters, "which 
have been allowed to escape the control of the original 
appropriators", and says there "is at least reasonable 
doubt'' that these "are still unappropriated waters". 
And, concludes that there is a ''reasonable likelihood'' 
[probability] that the applicant can p·erfect an appro-
priation. 
It can't be assumed as probable that the Reclama-
tion Department will ever attempt to repossess, or assert 
any claim of right to repossess, the waters here in-
volved. If they should, all that can be said, is that 
Respondent may. not be able to ~omplete his appropria-
tion as to some of the waters sought. This is the si tua-
tion on all applications to approp,riate, but this does not 
seem to be ground for denial. 
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On this see: Rocky Ford v. Kent's Lake, 135 
P. (2) 108 and particularly paragraph" 5-7'' page 
113. 
In any event, the right to apply to beneficial use 
the waters of the State cannot be left indefinitely to 
dangle because some disinterested person may i~timate 
that som·eone, somewhere, sometime, might claim a right 
therein. 
• 
The case of Ide v. U. S. cited (7) by Appellant is 
quit·e distinguishable. It does not involve this matter of 
mere approval of an application, so as to permit an 
attempted appropriation. We have already pointed out 
a difference, in that, the parties there were prosecuting 
their own claims. 
We will now point out some other distinguishing fea-
tures. The opinion shows that there the Government 
acquired the ownership and control of the use of all 
the waters involved and also the ownership and control 
of all the lands in the project, except one school section. 
This was sold by the State to the Defendants. 
!The Government was engaged in constructing its 
storage reservoir and in selling tracts of land, and with 
each tract, a project water right to use water enough 
to irrigate it. The project was not yet completed. It 
was pointed out that hy the act and under all the ar-
rangem·ents re-use of the water was contemplated and 
necessary, in order to have sufficient water to supply 
the us·ers on all the project lands. That the Government 
never abandoned or allowed the waters involved to es-
cape, but as soon as sufficient waters seeped into the 
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raYine fron1 the first diYision of the project to 1nake a 
flo"·, it took in1n1ediate steps to repossess it. It \vas 
the construction of the channel to carry this water that 
brought on the conflict. 
The Court there was not dealing with State super-
vision pr 'Yith the discretion of the statutory admin-
istrator of public 'vaters. The whole of the prop~erties, 
including the "·aters and lands of the project, had been 
taken, together, over and into Federal ownership and 
control. The case simply held that under the particular 
facts and circumstances involved, the Government was 
not precluded from re-capture and re-use of its waters. 
There is no record here on which that case, under 
those facts, can be given any application to this one . 
.. A.nd if this Court may take judicial knowledge, of facts 
with relation to Deer Creek, it will see that the en tire 
situatio~, as well as the nature of the proceedings, are 
different. 
We will state from our knowledge, after some exper-
ience with Deer Creek, some of the facts involved in 
this situation. The Government did acquire filings for 
approp-riation of Weber River waters for storage at 
Deer Creek. And, it entered into a contract with Provo 
River Water Users Association, a Utah Corporation, to 
advance money to it to construct the reservoir, - the 
money so advanced to be re-paid by the latter, upon 
'vhich re-payment the Government is to release to it all 
interests in the project including the filings. The Gov-
ernment owns and controls no lands to be irrigated. It 
does not distribute or regulate or control the distribu-
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tion of any waters to the irrigators. 
Users buy stock in the Association, and in the case 
of use for irrigation, and in the instance which we have 
her·e, the irrigators form another and separate Irriga-
tion District association. It buys the stock, and then its 
members in turn subscribe for shares in it, to meet their 
needs. The water is largely, if not entirely, used for 
supplemental irrigation, and not for r·eclamation,of new 
'lands. 
The water in this bench irrigation district is diverted 
from Provo River through the Provo Reservoir Canal. 
This diversion and canal ha¥e been there since 1913, 
but by enlargem·ent since about 1940, additional water 
has been diverted and used over an upper area of about 
fifteen miles in length, and of varying widths. It is 
diverted from the canal hy ditches and carried as high 
up toward the foothills as possible and, of course, the 
return flow is taken out below again and re-used. Some 
of it, thus, comes finally to the applicant who had used 
it on his upper lands for four years (T. 13) prior to the 
trial. 
Now, having in mind the Appellant's case Ide v. 
u. s., s:upra, and the quotation therein from a similar 
case, that even under those circumstances, and as to 
the repossession by the owner: "It is requisite, of course, 
that he be able to identify it" as his water. Let us com-
pare what we have her. 
Water under filings held by the Government, at least 
as security, is turned from the Weber to the Provo and 
mingled with its waters. Water released from storage 
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there is diverted by the first Association to the District 
~\.ssoriation and distributed by it to users, as above 
stated, and the return flo,Ys repeatedly re-used. Finally, 
the R.espondent, "~ho has aequired enough shares to 
double the irrigation of his land (T. 13) applies it on 
his 12~, acres CT. 9). This extends directly above and 
along the full length of the area in which the spring 
flo"~s arise (T. 14). The total water used above by him 
• 
would clearly exeeed the total sought ·by these applica-
tions. 
Applications of this kind are properly approved on 
the "probability" that the applicant might 'be able to 
complete an appropriation to part, at least, of th·e waters 
involved. This Court has used the term "probability" 
in this connection many times. 
Is it then '' eap,tious'' on the part of the Engineer, 
to assume it improbable that th·e holder of the Deer 
Creek filings will later claim the right to repossess, and 
attempt to repossess for use by it, this small amount of 
water so arising on Respondent's own land and which 
has escaped there for more than four years~ Is it prob-
able that such holder would attempt an identification 
or segregation of such higher supp~lem·ental irrigation 
users' waters, and these spring flows therefrom back 
to 1913~ 
Are they going back in this manner as to each indi-
vidual user to trace out such probable escap·ed waters, 
or could they practically, or legally, do so~ It is not 
probable. 
It would not seem necessary to pursue this distinc-
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tion or this inquiry at any greater length. It would seem 
to us much more probable, under the Utah decisions, 
that if such waters could be identified or repossessed, 
it would have to be by the individual users, and alone 
in connection with the immediate irrigation on their 
lands. And it appears they would have to act pcomptly 
enough to show an intention not to abandon or treat as 
escaped water, that which might have left and aris.en else-
where as seepage. And the principal right to so repos-
sess here is in the Respondent, if anywhere. The Gov-
ernment has, and has indicated, no inter~est in it. 
OONCLUSI~ON 
Without repetition, it seems clear, that Appellant 
is asserting no interest by it in the waters sought by 
respondent's applications, and is claiming no possible 
interfer·ence with its rights by the order, or by the judg-
ment appealed from. 
As an academic matter only, it has suggested that 
a possible claim by another, who is neither a protestant 
or a party, may render some portions of the waters 
sought unavailable. On the record here, the authority 
cited to support this, their third party claim, can be 
given no application or effect; and if it could, it is 
clearly distinguishable as to the nature of action, and 
on its facts. 
That the only claim relied upon here is not avail-
able to Appellant, as it has no interest therein and could 
not be a party thereto, and is in no way affected thereby. 
That the theory of the claim relied upon and the 
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issued tenderd on appeal, is not available because not 
raised or presented for decision in the lower Court. 
From \Yhich it would seem to follow that the judg-
ment of the trial Court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, and 
MULLIN·ER, PRINC'E & MULLIN·ER 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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